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III. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, American States Insurance, in its 
Appellee's Brief, has completely failed to address any of the 
relevant facts, law or arguments. Instead, it asserts that the 
whole matter depends upon whether or not Split Mountain Construc-
tion is, in fact, a partnership -- something Appellant/Defendant 
Deborah Turney has never ever disputed. This appeal is not about 
form of business. It is about the construction of a particular 
insurance policy provision regarding underinsured motorist 
coverage. Additionally, plaintiff offers no cogent reason why this 
court should not hold that Joseph Price was a "family member." 
Thus, this Court should reverse not only the granting of plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment, but also the denial of 
defendant's cross-motion. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Show That John Turnev Was Not A Named 
Insured, 
This case is about construing the policy's underinsured 
motorist provision in light of plaintiff's decision to list John 
Turney -- as an individual and by name -- as a named insured. As 
to this issue, Appellee's Brief is more significant for what it 
omits than for what it includes. It does not discuss the relevant 
policy provision or cite to any case involving insurance law. It 
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mentions unrelated policy provisions and cites to partnership law. 
It does not discuss the "real question" of whether or not Turney 
was a named insured, or address most of the arguments made in 
Appellant's Brief. 
POINT 1 This Appeal Turns upon the Language of the Policy. 
Plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action in response 
to defendant's claim under the underinsured motorist provision of 
the policy in question (R. 0075). Thus, it is rather astonishing 
that Appellee's Brief does not even mention that provision. 
Instead, plaintiff discusses (and even quotes) from the general 
commercial liability provision. See Appellee's Br., p. 3. This 
relates to different coverage and uses different language. 
Defendant agrees that there is no general commercial liability 
coverage for the non-business activities of family members. Her 
claim, however, relates to separately described coverage for 
injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. 
Ironically, the differences between the language of the 
underinsured motorist provision and the general commercial 
liability provision undermine, rather than support, plaintiff's 
position. The general commercial liability coverage is expressly 
limited to matters involving the conduct of the business, whereas 
the underinsured motorist coverage is not. The general commercial 
liability provision makes no reference to "family members" (only 
spouses), whereas the underinsured motorist provision provides 
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"family member" coverage.1 Moreover, this family coverage applies 
if "you" simply "are" an individual (R. 0075) . The general 
commercial provision uses the different phrase, lf[i]f you are 
designated in the Declaration as. . . ." (R. 0072.) 
Defendant's construction of the relevant policy provision 
stands unrebutted on this appeal. Accordingly, this Court should 
reverse. 
POINT 2 Plaintiff has Failed to Show that Form of Business is a 
Relevant Issue, 
Notwithstanding its insistence, that form of business is the 
decisive issue, plaintiff fails to identify any policy language 
which supports that position. Nothing in the policy either condi-
tions or limits underinsured motorist coverage based upon form of 
business. According to the plain language of the policy, this 
coverage depends solely upon who is a "Named Insured Shown in the 
Declaration" (R. 0070 & 0075) . See, Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-
A-Car, 845 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah App. 1992) (identity of named 
insureds depends upon who is listed as such in declaration) . John 
Turney is individually listed as a "Named Insured." Indeed, 
although he is listed along with Split Mountain on the first 
declaration, it is the partnership, rather than the individuals, 
xIt is also interesting that the general commercial coverage 
is the same for partnerships and sole proprietorships -- the 
principal (s) and spouse(s) . Discussing a provision, which makes no 
distinction between partnership and sole proprietorship, seems a 
bit inconsistent with the theory that form of business in the one 
and only issue. 
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which is omitted from the subsequent declarations -- including the 
underinsured motorist declaration. 
Plaintiff also cites to no law showing that form of business 
is relevant here. Plaintiff cites statutes and cases defining 
"partnership" and "joint venture." See, Appellee's Br. p. 4. It 
cites cases holding that partnerships are separate legal entities 
for some purposes. See, Appellee's Br., p.5. Defendant does not 
dispute these propositions -- she disputes their relevancy here. 
See, Appellant's Br., pp. 11-14. Split Mountain was a partnership 
which (for certain purposes) had an existence separate and distinct 
from Mssrs. Turney and Slaugh. That proves nothing. No aspect of 
partnership law precludes an insurer from covering individual 
partners instead of, or in addition to, the partnership. No aspect 
of partnership law creates a presumption that an insurance policy 
covers the partnership rather than the partners or both. Nothing 
in the law cited by plaintiff makes form of business relevant or 
controlling as to who or what is being insured, which is the issue 
here. 
POINT 3 Plaintiff has Failed to Refute the Arguments Made by 
Defendant, 
Plaintiff makes a half-hearted attempt to distinguish two of 
the many cases cited by defendant. See, Appellee's Br., p.5 
(discussing Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 
1985) and O'Hanlan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 639 F.2d 
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1019 (3rd Cir. 1981)).2 Otherwise, plaintiff neither discusses 
defendant's cases nor cites any authority involving insurance law. 
Plaintiff does not even cite to the cases which it cited below --
perhaps, because they are not in point, as defendant has asserted. 
See, Appellant's Br., pp. 16-18. Plaintiff, in particular, fails 
to address the only case in point -- namely, Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. App. 1974), in 
which the court held that a policy naming only the partnership 
covered family members of the partners. See, Appellant's Br., pp. 
12-13, 17. 
In Huddleston, supra, and the other cases cited by defendant, 
the courts allowed family member coverage in circumstances which 
were significantly less compelling than those presented here. In 
these cases, no individual was listed as a named insured, but only 
the corporation or partnership. Here, Turney was listed. At the 
very least, that creates an ambiguity which must be resolved in 
favor of coverage. See, United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). Plaintiff does not dispute this 
rule or that this policy is ambiguous and confusing. The real 
issue here is how a reasonable lay person would understand and 
interpret the policy. See, Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-25. Plaintiff 
does not dispute that a reasonable insured would understand the 
2Defendant cited these cases for the definition of the term 
"d/b/a." See, Appellant's Br., pp. 9-10. She acknowledged that 
they involved sole proprietorships, but noted that such distinc-
tion does not affect the meaning of "d/b/a." Id. 
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policy to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the family 
members of John Turney. 
POINT 4 Plaintiff Does Not Deny that it Could Have Easily Made it 
Clear that Price was not Covered. 
Defendant noted several ways in which plaintiff could have 
easily altered the language of the policy to unequivocally 
accomplish the result for which it now contends. Plaintiff's 
complete failure to respond leaves a number of interesting and 
critical questions unanswered. These are questions which the 
drafter of the policy should be able to answer. In the final 
analysis, the lack of any answer to these questions is, perhaps, 
the most powerful reason for reversal. 
Why was John Turney shown in the declaration as a Named 
Insured, if it was intended that he not be a named insured? If the 
partnership was intended to be the only named insured, why did 
plaintiff not list only Split Mountain Construction? If 
underinsured motorist coverage for family members is available only 
to a sole proprietorship, why does that provision use the phrase 
"if you are an individual," instead of "if you are doing business 
as a sole proprietor?" If coverage depends upon form of business, 
why does the policy not state as much directly? Indeed, if a 
partnership policy is not intended to provide any family member 
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coverage, why does it even contain a provision which refers to 
"family members?"3 
This was a confusing and ambiguous policy, which could have 
been easily clarified. The plaintiff, as the insurer, must bear 
the burden of having failed to do so. See, Government Employees 
Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982); Sandt, 854 
P.2d at 522. 
B. This Court Should Not Only Reverse The Judgment For Plaintiff, 
But Also The Denial of Defendants Cross-Motion. 
Plaintiff virtually concedes that, if this Court reverses the 
judgment, it should also mandate that judgment be entered for 
defendant. Plaintiff does not contend that it has any extrinsic 
evidence which would support its interpretation and which should be 
considered on remand. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of 
defendant, as a matter of law. See, Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522. 
Plaintiff does not contend that its mere assertion, that Price 
did not reside with Turney, is sufficient to raise an issue of 
fact. See, Appellant's Br., p. 20. Plaintiff's only contention, 
in this regard, is that defendant's affidavit as to Price's 
residence should not be considered because it was unsigned when 
filed. See, Appellee's Br., p. 7. Defendant has already fully 
advised this Court as to that circumstance. See, Appellant's Br., 
3As noted, several courts have held that a policy which refers 
to family member coverage, but provides none, is inherently 
ambiguous. See, King v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380 
(Ohio 1988) and authorities cited at Appellant's Br., pp. 15-16. 
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p. 2, n.l & p. 19, n.4. Although an unsigned affidavit was filed at 
first, a signed affidavit was filed and served two days later (R. 
0185) . This was almost four months prior to the hearing on the 
parties' motions. A two-day delay, months before hearing, is not 
even significant, much less prejudicial. Indeed, the trial court 
did not strike this evidence or hold it to be inadmissable, and 
there is no basis for doing so now. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The separate legal status of partnerships in general is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to sustain the judgment for plaintiff. 
Even if that point has some bearing upon the real issue of con-
struing the relevant policy provisions, it is certainly not 
dispositive. Yet, it is the only argument urged by the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment 
for the defendant, or in the alternative, for trial. 
DATED this day of July, 1997. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for/£^ain£^S» 
By: f ft^S* {.S 
J. BRADFORD DEBRY 
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